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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ABORTION
Judge Richard Posner, now of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, is frequently mentioned as a possible candidate for the Supreme Court.
In his former capacity as a member of the University of Chicago faculty, he was
perhaps the nation's most influential legal scholar. He is best known as the leading
figure in the Law and Economics school of legal thought. Among his other interesting and innovative proposals was a suggestion that a market for babies should be
established. Surely that concept could be taken further. Where, we wondered,
would it lead? The article might start something like this.

Abortion is customarily approached as a matter involving
rights, either of the mother or of the unborn fetus. It is not surprising that such a crude form of analysis has failed to produce any
definitive solution, or that the subject has remained highly controversial. As usual, economic analysis is a far more subtle and sophisticated analytical tool.
Abortion is a classic example of market failure. One of the
interested parties, the fetus (or, under another philosophical view,
the person whom the fetus would become if the abortion did not
take place) is in no position to enter into an arms-length transaction. The adult into whom the fetus would have grown might value
his life at a higher amount than the parents value the abortion. If
the fetus had access to the potential assets it could acquire as an
adult, and it had the bargaining abilities of an adult, it might well be
able to afford to pay the parents enough to persuade them not to
have an abortion. Under these circumstances, allowing the abortion
is economically inefficient. A temporal market barrier prevents the
economically efficient solution from being attained.
The solution, however, is not a ban on abortions but the creation of a market. A representative could be appointed on behalf of
the fetus to bid against the parents on the abortion decision. Since
most fetuses have no assets, they would presumably have to borrow
against their future earnings. If the parents win the bidding war,
they could have the abortion, but must pay their winning bid into
the Fetal Bank. If the fetus wins, it is allowed to be born, but some
share of its future earnings would be paid to the bank. Funds in the
Bank could be used for loans to fetuses; any excess would be available either for redistribution (under a liberal regime), or perhaps
even better, could be invested in embryonic industries.
Some objections might be raised to this scheme, but rigorous
analysis shows them to be unfounded. One counterargument is that
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the poor would be forced to have abortions, since they would not be
able to outbid their fetuses. But the children of the poor generally
have low earning capacities; therefore, the fetuses of the poor would
also be in low income brackets. Impoverished fetuses would be able
to borrow relatively little money, and hence would be on an equal
footing with their equally impoverished parents.
Another possible objection is the existence of externalities. Allowing an abortion offends pro-life individuals. The answer is that
they too might enter the bidding, along with pro-choice advocates,
those who wished to adopt the children, those favoring zero population growth, and others.
A more serious objection is that some parents might dishonestly claim that they intended to get abortions, only as a way of
forcing their fetuses to bid against them, and thereby capturing a
share of the fetus's future earnings. If the fetus's bid were paid to
the parents, this would be a potentially serious problem. It is preferable, therefore, for the fetus's earnings to be paid only to the
Bank, thus eliminating the incentive.
One advantage of this free-market approach is that it mirrors
some common beliefs about when abortion is more appropriate, or
at least more understandable. Fetuses with genetic defects would
have low future earning potential, and thus would often be outbid
by their parents. Also, the longer the pregnancy continues, the
shorter the period for which the fetus would need to borrow the
money; hence, the discounted present value of the fetus's future
earnings would rise sharply. An abortion late in pregnancy could
easily require a parent to bid thousands of dollars more than an
abortion early in pregnancy. Also, since the decision to abort
would be expensive, there would be a strong incentive for those who
do not desire children to use contraception.
Unlike any other proposed approach to the abortion issue, this
approach gives full weight to the interests of both the fetus and the
parents. True, those who believe in choice may be disconcerted that
such a fundamental choice must be paid for, while those who are
pro-life may be offended that fetuses must bid for their lives.* Still,
as the great Milton Friedman has told us more than once, "there's
no free lunch."
D.A.F.
• One commentator has said that this approach "seems almost pathological in its disregard of
the moral values on both sides." Farber, The "Law and Economics" Movement, in RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND SOCIAL POLICY (J. Miller & M. Lewis ed. 1986). That
commentator's work evidences all too clearly a lack of rigorous economic training.

